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I. INTRODUCTION
With its decision in Maryland v. King,' the Supreme Court finally stepped
into the debate about the use of DNA databases in the American criminal justice
system. Even for a cautious Court, this took some time in coming. The national
system for sharing DNA profiles, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), 2
was authorized by Congress in 1994.3 Virginia had already established a state
DNA database in 1989.4 And as in many criminal justice matters, we are number
one. As of June 2013, the United States has the largest DNA database in the
world, with 10.4 million offender profiles and 1.5 million arrestee profiles.5
With King, the Court decided a newly emerging database issue rather than an
old one: whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the collection of DNA samples
from arrestees without a warrant or any individualized suspicion. (While this
question had been the subject of disagreement among the lower courts, whether
DNA samples could be collected from convicted offenders seems to have been
settled without any involvement from the Court at all.6) Justice Kennedy's opinion
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1 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
2 Although CODIS specifically refers to the software used to link various DNA databases, it
is also used a generic term to describe the DNA database system more generally. See What is
CODIS, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet.
(last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
See DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (1994) (codified as 42 U.S. §
14131 (2013)).
4 See, e.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA DATA BANKS,
CR IMNAL INVESTIGATONS, AND CIvIL LIBERTIES 38 (2011).
See FBI, CODIS-NDISStatistics, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics
(last visited Sept 18, 2013). Offender profiles here include both convicted offender, detainee (non-citizens
who are detained), and legal profiles. CODIS also includes categories of other DNA profiles,
including missing persons and crime scene evidence.
6 See, e.g., ANNA C. HENNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40077, COMPULSORY DNA
COLLECTION: A FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 9 (2010) (observing that "nearly all courts that
reviewed laws authorizing compulsory DNA collection [except against arrestees] upheld the laws
against Fourth Amendment challenges").
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for the five member majority held that the collection of DNA swabs from Alonzo
King and others like him were reasonable Fourth Amendment searches, given the
outcome of a balancing of interests between the individual and government. In a
sharply written dissent, Justice Scalia condemned the approval of suspicionless
searches actually conducted for law enforcement purposes, and for crafting a
decision that was unlikely to be cabined by the particulars of King's case or
Maryland's statute.' The King majority opinion, however, affirms that the age of
DNA in criminal justice is here to stay.
The problem with King is that it may become influential in ways that were not
fully contemplated by the Supreme Court. While some may lament the
micromanagement of policing by the modem Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the
reality is that police investigation practices are unevenly regulated. Indeed, what
King reveals is the extent to which the Court leaves many matters untouched by
Fourth Amendment constraints and subjects them, for better or worse, to the
control of the other political branches (as well as to likely squabbling in the lower
courts). This essay discusses three notable revelations in the Court's decision
about the future of policing and genetic privacy. As the following sections discuss,
however, what the Court introduces, it also fails to regulate or even guide in any
significant sense.
II. "WHEN THE SEARCH INVOLVES No DISCRETION" 8 :
DISCRETIONARY POLICE JUDGMENTS
First, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion permits the police to use arrests
instrumentally and to collect DNA samples from those whom the police may
suspect are involved in other unrelated crimes. This possibility arises from the
Court's longstanding reluctance to rein in police discretion under the Fourth
Amendment, coupled with the King majority's glib dismissal of concerns about
these judgments.
We can begin with the King case itself. When Maryland police arrested
Alonzo King for assault in 2009, they had no idea that he might be connected to an
unrelated and unsolved 2003 rape. The police only had a basis to believe King was
involved in the latter crime after receiving information from the state Forensic
Sciences Division that his DNA profile taken from the assault arrest matched crime
scene evidence from the rape. 9 In support of the conclusion that the search, in the
form of the cheek swab taken from King, was reasonable, Justice Kennedy noted
that the DNA collection from King was "not subject to the judgment of officers
whose perspective might be 'colored by their primary involvement in the often
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013).
Id.
Id. at 1966.
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competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."" 0 In short, to the extent that police
discretion is ever a problem, it was not, for the King majority, a problem in the
collection of arrestee DNA for database inclusion.
Yet this is a miserly reading of "discretion." While it is true that Maryland
law does require the police to take DNA samples from all of those arrested for a
qualifying offense like King's," this is only one of the potentially discretionary
judgments the police make, and a decision made late in the contact between the
police and King. Let's reimagine the King facts. What if the police had a hunch
that King was involved in the 2003 rape case, but had no basis to apply for a
warrant to obtain a DNA sample? Could the police decide to arrest King for a
different offense-assuming that they had the necessary probable cause-when
they had the opportunity?
The Supreme Court's decisions on police discretion make the answer a clear
"yes." In Whren v. United States,' 2 one of the many "war on drugs" cases from the
1990s, the Court makes it apparent that complaints about the actual enforcement
motivations of the police are irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment. Although
the defendants in Whren focused on the likely but impossible to prove race-based
assumptions of the D.C. vice officers in their case, Justice Scalia's majority
opinion shows little patience for any claims about the ulterior motives of the
police, so long as probable cause for a criminal offense exists." Much to the
dismay of those who have criticized the instrumental use of the traffic laws for
illegal drug enforcement against minority drivers, Justice Scalia declared the
Fourth Amendment to be the wrong forum for such claims.14 Yet Wren should
not be understood as a case only about racially motivated policing; Whren's
approach protects any "secret" motive the police harbor, so long as some
underlying criminal offense exists to justify the stop or arrest. Indeed, as the Court
made clear later in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, even mere dislike of the arrestee
provides no basis for a Fourth Amendment claim, so long as some criminal law
violation existed. 15
Thus the Fourth Amendment poses no obstacle to the instrumental use of the
substantive criminal laws by the police. And so in our King hypothetical, the
1o Id. at 1970 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968)).
" MD. PUB. SAF. CODE ANN. §§ 2-504(a)(3)(i) & 14-101 (2013), unconstitutional as applied
by Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (stating that "a DNA sample shall be collected from an
[eligible] individual. . .") (emphasis added).
12 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
13 Id. at 813 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.").
14 id,
's 532 U.S. 318 (2001). Formally, of course, Atwater focuses on whether the Fourth
Amendment requires a crime to be sufficiently "serious" to support a custodial arrest. The facts
strongly suggest, though, that the incident arose out of some personal animus the officer harbored
toward the defendant. Id. at 324 (noting that the officer yelled "[w]e've met before" and "[y]ou're
going to jail" before the defendant's young children).
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police would have been free to rely on a hunch to target King for his DNA (for
crime 1) and arrest him for an unrelated offense (crime 2). In the actual King
opinion, Justice Kennedy does acknowledge that sometimes police receive the
benefit of having arrested someone on one offense-usually minor-only to
realize that the person is responsible for a much more serious offense. Such
inadvertent discoveries caught both Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh and
serial killer Joel Rifkin.' 6 That Justice Kennedy only speaks of fortuitous
discoveries is of little significance, though. If police motives are unregulated by
the Fourth Amendment, then it is irrelevant whether the police discover that
someone is involved in a second crime unrelated to the crime of arrest through
design or happenstance.17 In neither case can a defendant complain.
These motivations are not fanciful. The investigation of the "grim sleeper"
murders in Southern California is illustrative of the instrumental use of arrest for
DNA collection. Frustrated by the "cold case," the LAPD tried various methods of
tracking down the killer. Although the police did not know who the person was,
they did have DNA evidence taken from the crime scenes and hoped for a possible
match. One technique the LAPD used-though ultimately without success-relied
upon the instrumental arrests of prostitution "johns" found in the areas where the
suspect was thought to frequent.18
The police used these arrests as a DNA "dragnet"; those arrestees matching
the demographic profile of the unknown killer were asked to consent to a DNA
swab.19 In such a dragnet, DNA sample collection depends on voluntary consent.
A statute authorizing compulsory collection of genetic samples makes the
instrumental use of arrest for genetic sampling even easier for the police. Thus,
while the (retrospectively innocent) johns could have refused consent to genetic
sampling, a law that authorized compulsory arrestee DNA collection would offer
them no such choice, even if the police lacked probable cause that any one of them
had any connection to the murders.2 o (The LAPD did eventually find the person
they identified as the perpetrator, Lonnie Franklin, through a different type of
16 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971 (2013).
17 The difficulty of divining the "real" motivations of the police goes a long way to explain
why the Court eliminated the "inadvertence" requirement in the plain view doctrine. See Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 138-42 (1990) (eliminating "inadvertence" requirement for plain view
seizures).
1s Joel Rubin, LAPD Goes Undercover to Find a Killer, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 1, 2008.
'9 See id.
20 California now authorizes the collection of DNA for all felony arrests, but did not do so
until 2009, after this dragnet was used. Even so, the technique here would likely not fall under the
current version of the DNA collection law, as prostitution under most circumstances is a
misdemeanor in California. See Cal. Penal Code § 296(a)(2)(C)(2013) (authorizing felony arrestee
DNA sampling); see also Cal. Dep't of Justice, Expansion of State's DNA Data Bank Program on
Jan. 1, 2009: Collection of DNA Samples from all Adults Arrested for Any Felony Offense, (Dec. 15,
2008), http://oag.ca.gov/sites/allfiles/pdfs/bfs/691B_121508.pdf; Ca. Penal Code 647(b) (defining
prostitution).
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genetic match: a familial search of the state database that turned up his son
Christopher's DNA profile and later through the collection of discarded trash from
a restaurant that yielded Franklin's own DNA and confirmed a match. 21)
What King fails to acknowledge is that the very existence of a DNA database
gives the police incentives to turn every encounter into an arrest.22 This may arise
out of a general desire to add more profiles to the database. For as long as the
police have existed, they have sought some way of rounding up the "usual
suspects," and in this respect the desire to create a rogues' gallery of genetic
material is not far-fetched. In other cases, the police may specifically seek the
DNA of a particular individual-as per our hypothetical-yet lack probable cause
for a warrant to collect his DNA sample. 23 While it is true that database laws give
the police few choices at the literal moment of sample collection,24 little reins in
the police in their decision about whom to target, when, and why. Similar
concerns have been raised about the United Kingdom's DNA database, which
contains profiles for nearly ten percent of the population. 25 In 2009, the British
Human Genetics Commission, an independent government advisory body, in
assessing privacy concerns about its country's DNA database, quoted one police
21 Jennifer Steinhauer, 'Grim Sleeper'Arrest Fans Debate on DNA Use, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/us/09sleeper.html. These techniques,
particularly familial searches, have generated their own controversies and commentary. See, e.g.,
Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 304
(2010) (arguing "flatly against familial search methods").
22 See HUMAN GENETICS COMM'N (U.K.), NOTHING TO HIDE, NOTHING TO FEAR?: BALANCING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE GOVERNANCE AND USE OF THE NATIONAL DNA
DATABASE 21 (2009) ("[T]he way that a decision to create a national DNA database can result in
changes to police practice, to the likelihood and procedure of arrest, to decisions about which crimes
are investigated, to the way crimes are committed and even to the sorts of crimes that are
committed.").
23 Even if the King opinion had come out in King's favor, however, the police appear to have
a number of other options. Police have surreptitiously collected DNA from suspects, either through
collecting discarded materials or through simple ruses. The lower courts for the most part have
declared that such actions do not even qualify as Fourth Amendment searches. For a general
discussion of these issues, see Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth
Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 857 (2006). Indeed, Maryland Attorney
General Doug Gensler scoffed that "if police are ... genuinely interested in someone's DNA, they
could just go pick up their Diet Coke can at the McDonald's." See Elizabeth Flock, Privacy Experts:
Supreme Court Ruling on DNA Swabs Could Lead to Big Brother Scenario, U.S. NEWS, June 4,
2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/0 6/04/privacy-experts-supreme-court-ruling-on-
dna-swabs-could-lead-to-big-brother-scenario.
24 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (describing Maryland's law as requiring the
collection of DNA samples from all arrestees "charged with serious crimes").
25 Tom Whitehead, More Than One in 10 People in DNA Database for First Time, THE
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 27, 2009, 6:54 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/6448452/More-than-one-in-10-people-on-DNA-database-for-first-time.html. Although CODIS
contains the largest number of profiles, the U.K.'s database has the largest number of profiles per
capita. See KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 4, at 167.
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official as saying that DNA collection had wrought a change over police attitudes
because
[i]t is apparently understood by serving police officers that . .. the DNA
of the offender can be obtained: samples can be obtained after arrest but
not if there is a report for summons . . . It is now the norm to arrest
offenders for everything if there is a power to do so. 2 6
These same incentives will have an impact even beyond the CODIS context,
as a growing number of law enforcement agencies collect DNA for their own
"offline" databases. To be included into CODIS, a sample must comply with
federal law, both in terms of the qualifying conviction, arrest, or detention,27 and
the standards of the laboratory processing the sample.28 But these requirements do
not apply if a police department decides to set up its own DNA database,
something a growing number of law enforcement agencies have chosen to do. Few
or no rules regulate these databases, such as New York City's, which contains
11,000 profiles. 29 The DNA database maintained by the District Attorney's office
of Orange County, California has collected more than 90,000 DNA profiles (up
from just 15,000 a few years ago 30), many of which were obtained in exchange for
dropped charges in misdemeanor arrests such as criminal trespass.31 Interested in
obtaining DNA samples from those not eligible for compulsory collection under
state law, or simply frustrated with state DNA analysis backlogs, police chiefs tout
these local databases as valuable investigative tools. 32  In some cases, these
"rogues" DNA databases collect samples not only from arrestees, but also from
volunteers (including victims who might be considered perpetrators one day) and
suspects.
Finally, these exercises of police discretion, now given de facto approval by
King, will almost certainly exacerbate the already racially disproportionate
26 HUMAN GENETICS COMM'N supra note 22, at 21-22 (emphasis added) (quoting a "retired
senior police officer").
27 24 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1) (listing eligible records that may be added to CODIS).
28 24 U.S.C. § 14132(b) (specifying conditions under which information may be added to
CODIS).
29 See Joseph Goldstein, Police Agencies are Assembling Records ofDNA, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/13/us/police-agencies-are-assembling-
records-of-dna.html?smid-pl-share.
30 Tami Abdollah, Orange County D.A.'s DNA database rapidly growing, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2009, available at http://articles.1atimes.com/2009/oct/05/local/me-oc-dna-database5.
31 See Goldstein, supra note 29.
32 Id. In a 2012 magazine article the director of public safety for Bensalem, PA, stated that
his department's local DNA database held 4,000 samples in a township of 60,000 residents. See
Frederick Harran, Adding DNA to the Investigative Toolbox, SHERIFF, Sept./Oct. 2012, at 56.
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representation in our DNA databases.33 Drawing the line at arrestees may be "the
worst choice of all."34 As law enforcement agencies become more aggressive in
collecting greater numbers of DNA samples with disproportionate racial effects,
there may be good social justice reasons to consider a universal database. 35
III. "To HOLD FOR A SERIOUS OFFENSE" 3 : CRIMINAL SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE
One might point out that some of the concerns about instrumental policing
were already anticipated in the King majority opinion. The majority limits the
decision's holding to instances when "officers make an arrest supported by
probable cause to hold for a serious offense . . . "3 Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion, however, rightly focuses on this tenuous limitation. 38 While it is true that
at the time of King's offense, Maryland limited arrestee DNA collection to certain
qualifying felony offenses, little in King's logic suggests that the Fourth
Amendment bars the expansion of eligible offenses to minor crimes. In short,
legislative discretion is as untouched as police discretion.
Much of this can be blamed on balancing. In Justice Kennedy's view, the
interests in King are the "quick and painless"39 swab of the arrestee's cheek, on the
one hand, and an important governmental "interest in identification," 40 on the
other. The characterization of the arrestee's interest is especially problematic;
King complained about the information taken from him, 41 not the Q-tip in his
33 See Andrea Roth, Maryland v. King and the Wonderful, Horrible DNA Revolution in Law
Enforcement, II OHIO ST. CRIM. L. J. 295 (2013). Roth's Term Paper is also published in this issue.
34 See id at 308.
35 Simon A. Cole, How Much Justice Can Technology Afford? The Impact of DNA Technology on
Equal Ciminal Justice, 34 SCIENCE & PUB. POL'Y 95, 102-03 (2007) (discussing merits of a universal DNA
database to address inequality concerns).
36 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
37 Id (emphasis added); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct 1958
(2013) (No. 12-207), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts/12-207.pdf (quoting Justice
Breyer: "The only thing we have to decide is whether a person, where there's probable cause to arrest
a person for those four crimes, their fingerprints [and DNA] are all taken.").
" King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When there comes before us the taking of
DNA from an arrestee for a traffic violation, the Court will predictably (and quite rightly) say, 'We
can find no significant difference between this case and King."').
39 Id. at 1968 (majority opinion).
40 Id. at 1971.
41 And while the DNA profile uploaded into CODIS provides limited information, the sample
retained by the state is not so limited. The extent of protection given to this "vast genetic treasure
map" depends on each State's laws and what they offer in terms of preventing the government from
analyzing that sample for other purposes. See King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 596 (2012) ("Although the
Maryland DNA Collection Act restricts the DNA profile to identifying information only, we can not
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mouth.42 Justice Kennedy suggests that there are few privacy concerns even in the
information derived from these samples because the thirteen standardized CODIS
markers correspond to non-coding "junk" DNA, and because Maryland law limits
what can be done to the biological samples themselves.4 3 The privacy concerns
are more complicated than he suggests. The designation "junk" is misleading if it
means that no sensitive information could be gleaned from these noncoding
regions.44  Moreover, the limits imposed on further access to and use of these
samples varies considerably from state to state.4 5
The majority's view of the government's interest is equally problematic. An
arrestee's "identity" encompasses any past criminal acts, as well as the simple
verification of his person.46  For now, however, assume this characterization is
adequate. If the government is interested in "identifying" arrestees, why would the
gravity of the offense matter? If utility is the metric, it will always be useful for
the government to collect more information about criminals.47
turn a blind eye to the vast genetic treasure map that remains in the DNA sample retained by the
state.").
42 The focus on the intrusion into the arrestee's body, however, isn't unusual. Fourth
Amendment analysis centers on how the government acquires the information. In the context of
DNA, however, where the acquisition is conducted with little literal intrusion, that analysis fails to
take into account the content of the information. This has been especially true in cases where the
government collects "shed" or "abandoned" DNA from suspects without their knowledge. For an
analysis of these issues, see Joh, supra note 23; see also Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The
Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 330-31 (2012) ("Current Fourth
Amendment law emphasizes acquisition ... It cares little for what happens next-to what use that
information is put.").
43 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980.
4 See, e.g., KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 4, at 234-235 (observing that "no serious
scientist refers to noncoding regions any longer as 'junk'.").
45 See, e.g., DusTIN HAYS, DNA, FORENSICS, AND THE LAW (2008) available at
http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/issuebriefpdfs/DNA,%20Forensics,%2and%20the%20Law%20Is
sue%20Brief.pdf (noting that "many states authorize access to their DNA forensic databases for non-
law-enforcement purposes," including unspecified "humanitarian" purposes); see also David Lazer &
Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Statutory Frameworks for Regulating Information Flows: Drawing
Lessons for the DNA Data Banks From Other Government Data Systems, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 366
(2006) (observing that "the retention of physical DNA samples ... invites re-purposing at a later
stage"); Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in Law Enforcement:
What Role for Privacy?, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 158 (2006) (noting that "as long as [DNA]
samples are stored, there is a possibility that they could be used by unauthorized third parties in ways
that might lead to disclosure of confidential information, or for malicious, retributive, or oppressive
purposes").
46 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1971 ("A suspect's criminal history is a critical part of his identity that
officers should know when processing him for detention.").
47 This assumption-that more information will always be better-also ignores the serious
limitations on the science of DNA identification, as well as publicized instances of human error that
have led to erroneous identifications. See, e.g., Osagie K. Obasogie, Op-ed., High-Tech, High-Risk
Forensics, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2013 (describing wrongfil arrest for murder based on DNA sample
contaminated by paramedics).
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King does little to limit states from expanding the scope of their arrestee
profiles to all arrestees, regardless of the severity of the offense. As highly
regulated as constitutional criminal procedure is, substantive criminal law is not.
And as William Stuntz pointed out, the imposition of constitutional law makes
some kinds of legislation easier, and others more difficult in terms of political
benefits and costs.4 8 Thus, legislatures have been less inclined to add on to Fourth
Amendment restrictions 49 than they have been eager to enlarge the reach of
substantive criminal law, because it is an area relatively untouched by the Supreme
Court's case law.5 o
Legislatures are free to widen the scope of King in two ways. First,
legislatures can expand the group of arrestees eligible for compulsory DNA
collection. The expansion of the convicted offender database is illustrative. When
the federal government first established CODIS, most states only collected DNA
samples from those convicted of violent felonies or felony sex offenses.s' Over
time, however, the pool of eligible convictions has only grown. Today, all states
require all convicted felons to submit a DNA sample; a majority of states require
those convicted of misdemeanor sex offenses to do the same.52 In 2012, New
York became the first "all crimes state"; the state DNA database will now include
samples from all misdemeanor convictions, in addition to felony convictions.53
This means that those convicted of crimes as minor as jumping subway tumstiles
and shoplifting will have their DNA samples collected for inclusion in the state
DNA database.54
That same expansion is likely to happen for eligible arrestees. While most of
the twenty-eight states collecting DNA samples from arrestees do so only for
violent offenses or felonies, a handful already authorize DNA collection from
some misdemeanor arrestees.55 If permitting DNA collection for minor offenses
can catch a terrorist or murderer, as Justice Kennedy suggests, that information is
indeed valuable. Any piece of information that helps "identify" criminals is a
useful one that, under King's logic, is not limited to felony arrests. With available
48 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARv. L. REV. 780,
793 (2006) ("Mandatory rules have the opposite effect. The existence of any given constitutional rule
tends to reduce support for friendly legislation.").
49 Id. at 792.
50 Id. at 802-03 (explaining why "crime definition and sentencing" are "politically easier"
than legislating police procedures).
51 See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41800, DNA TESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
BACKGROUND, CURRENT LAW, GRANTS, AND ISSUES 7 (2012).
52 See id.
5 See John Eligon & Thomas Kaplan, New York State Set to Add All Convict DNA to Its
Database, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/nyregion/dna-database-
pensions-and-redistricting-are-part-of-talks-on-major-albany-deal.html.
5 See id.
ss See DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/collection-from-arrestees.htm.
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data suggesting that one out of three Americans have been arrested for some
offense by age twenty-three, the impact of such an expansion across jurisdictions
would be dramatic.56
Second, legislatures can add profiles to a DNA database by making more
legal violations subject to arrest, rather than only to citation. Thus, legislative
discretion gives rise to greater police discretion. The United Kingdom's
experience with its own DNA database, the National DNA Database (NDNAD),
established in 1995, provides such an example. Parliamentary passage of the
Criminal Justice Act of 2003 permitted systematic collection of DNA samples
from arrestees for inclusion in the NDNAD. 57  These were limited to arrests for
"recordable" offenses: a classification that restricted the police from arresting those
involved in minor offenses.58  With the passage of the 2005 Serious Organized
Crime and Police Act, however, all crimes are now subject to arrest, including
minor crimes such as driving in a bus lane and dropping litter, so long as the police
believe that it is "necessary" to arrest the relevant person. 59 The resulting increase
in the number of profiles in the NDNAD has not, however, led to an appreciable
increase in the percentage of crimes solved through DNA profile matches.o While
it is true that there is already a broad range of arrestable offenses under American
criminal law, King invites even further legislative expansion of those crimes
subject to arrest.
56 See Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Prevalence ofArrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National
Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25 (2012) (concluding that "arrest experiences are common among
American youth (most likely on the order of I out of 3 by age 23)" based on self-reported survey
data), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2011/12/14/peds.2010-
3710.full.pdf+html.
57 See HUMAN GENETICS COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 31; Helen Wallace, The U.K.
National DNA Database: Balancing Crime Detection, Human Rights and Privacy, 7 EMBO REPORTS
S26 (2006) (observing that provision permitting compulsory DNA collection upon arrest happened
with little "public attention and debate").
58 See KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 4, at 170 (outlining key legislation for NDNAD); Arrests for
All Offences Proposed BBC NEWS, (Aug. 17, 2004), http-//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/politics/3557266.stm
(noting proposal to permit in theory arests for all offenses).
s9 See, e.g., James Slack, Big Brother Britain has World's Biggest DNA Database, DAILY
MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 5, 2006), http/www.dailymail.co.uk/news/aticle-373249/Big-Brother-Britain-worlds-
biggest-DNA-database.html#ixzz2YKu37T7J; Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 19, 2009), http//www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ibertycental/2008/dec/16/serious-organised-crime-
act (noting that the Act "[m]akes all offences anestable").
60 See HOUSE OF COMMONS HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THE NATIONAL DNA DATABASE:
EIGHTH REPORT OF SESSION 2009-10 5 (2010) (estimating that "as little as .3%" of those crimes
resulted in a person being charged can be attributed to a DNA match).
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IV. "THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN IDENTIFICATION"61 : TERRY DNA STOPs
By relying on a balancing of interests that will surely never favor the
individual from whom a DNA sample is taken, the King majority invites (and
nearly decides) what is likely to be one of the next important DNA controversies in
policing: Terry stops that involve the compulsory collection of DNA. Justice
Ginsburg directly raised the question in the King oral argument. 62
In Terry itself, by choosing to regulate stop and frisks under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court ended up legitimating them as police practices. In these
potentially volatile situations, the Terry Court held, the police may pursue their
interests in "effective crime prevention and detection," even in the absence of
probable cause or a warrant.63 A Terry stop and frisk permits the police to conduct
brief investigations of the detained person, so long as reasonable in scope relative
to the basis for the stop. 4 That investigation includes the "identity" of the
suspect.
Thus in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, the Court upheld
Larry Hiibel's arrest for refusing to identify himself under Nevada's stop-and-
66identify statute. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in that case emphasized that
"questions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many
Terry stops." 67  From confirming a suspect's identity, continued the majority
opinion, the police could discover whether "a suspect is wanted for another
offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder."6 8  Those very words
reappear in the King majority opinion's justification for compulsory arrestee DNA
collection.69
All of which is to say that King provides few brakes on this logical next step
in DNA collection. If "knowledge of identity" has long been an acceptable
objective in the Terry context,70 and a DNA profile is a part of the individual's
61 Maryland v. King 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971 (2013).
62 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-207),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts/I 2-207.pdf.
63 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
6 Id. at 20 ("whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place").
65 Id. at 28 (noting that in Terry itself, Officer McFadden asked the suspects "their names ...
to dispel [his] reasonable belief' about their criminal activity).
66 542 U.S. 177, 182 (2004) (categorizing Nevada's law as one of many "stop and identify"
statutes).
67 Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
68 Id.
69 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1972 (2013)
7o Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186.
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identity for Fourth Amendment purposes,71 its collection would seem appropriate
even in circumstances short of arrest. Terry itself contemplated that those detained
could reasonably be subjected to practices to which they objected (thus the forced
patdowns of Terry, Chilton, and Katz in Terry72), so compulsory DNA swabbing
would not seem to stretch those boundaries. If the analysis yielding the "identity"
of a person subjected to the stop does not unduly prolong the stopn such an
additional procedure would seem to fall within Terry's scope.74
When that day comes, the forced collection of DNA during investigative
detentions will have a much larger social impact than arrestee DNA collection,
particularly if one considers that most routine traffic stops qualify as Terry stops. 75
If a citizen encounters a police officer, the most common reason will be because
she is pulled over as a driver in a traffic stop.76 The lower courts have granted the
police wide latitude in what they may do in such stops, including computer checks
on the driver's criminal history.77 If such checks fall within Terry's scope, it is
hard to see why a cheek swab and a check against a DNA database would not as
well.
For the moment, such DNA Terry stops are not routine police practice. DNA
testing in a laboratory can take several days or longer. It took several weeks for
Maryland to analyze and upload King's profile to CODIS.78  However, the
technology for rapid DNA analysis that requires no scientific expertise and that can
71 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970-75 (discussing how DNA profiles aid the government's interest in
identifying the arrestee).
72 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983).
74 And such an additional intrusion is unlikely to run afoul of Terry, given the rapid expansion
of the permissible scope of the stop and frisk itself, including the "trend granting officers greater
latitude in using force in order to 'neutralize' potentially dangerous suspects during an investigatory
detention." United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).
7 Although the Supreme Court has never directly decided the issue, many lower courts have
cited dicta from Berkemer v. McCarty that states "the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-
called 'Terry stop' than to a formal arrest." 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citations omitted). For a
contrary view, see David A. Moran, Traffic Stops, Littering Tickets, and Police Warnings: The Case
of a Fourth Amendment Non-Custodial Arrest Doctrine, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1143 (2000) (arguing
that most traffic stops should be considered non-custodial arrests rather than Terry stops).
76 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 1 (2011),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp08.pdf (noting that most common reason for
face-to-face contact with police was "being a driver in a traffic stop"). The last findings published by
the BJS in 2008 report that of the 40 million Americans aged 16 or older who had face-to-face
contact with the police, about 44.1% of them did so as a driver in a traffic stop. Id. at 1-2.
n See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" From Start to Finish: Too Much
"Routine, " Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1881 (2004) (observing that
"[m]ost courts confronted with the issue have concluded that a criminal-history check is a valid part
of a traffic stop").
78 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1984 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing timeline
of processing King's DNA sample).
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be conducted away from a lab is approaching.7 9 Rapid DNA kits provide a fully
automated process of extracting a DNA profile from a cheek swab at the point of
collection: a "swab-in/profile-out" process.so In 2010, the FBI established a Rapid
DNA Program Office to guide the development of technological standards; its goal
is to help introduce a kit that will produce a DNA profile within two hours or less 8'
of the sample collection.82 The FBI intends to help police integrate Rapid DNA
analysis technology into post-arrest booking procedures, and eventually to use
these arrest analyses as a "fourth tier" of the National DNA Index System. 83
As with DNA analysis generally, however, once the technology for Rapid
DNA is developed, there is good reason to believe that law enforcement agencies
will be interested in using such kits for their own objectives as well, whether or not
state legislatures or the federal government decide to approve of sample collection
during Terry stops for inclusion into CODIS or state databases. Companies
developing rapid DNA technology promise to deliver immediate results for "on-
scene screening of suspects,"84 not just for arrestees or for crime scene evidence.
Companies like California-based Integenx are encouraging law enforcement
agencies to consider rapid DNA testing as a tool that permits them to "decide much
more [sic] where and how evidence gets tested and what gets tested": a decision
that includes using suspect profiles that are not currently approved for inclusion
into CODIS."
79 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National District Attorneys Association in Support of
Petitioner at *19, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-207), 2012 WL 6762584
(describing current DNA analysis, which can take weeks to complete, as "soon [to] be obsolete"
when replaced by Rapid DNA analysis).
so See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA
Index System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-
sheet (last visited Nov. 10, 2013, 9:40 PM).
81 A Department of Homeland Security document obtained by the Electronic Freedom
Foundation suggests that the federal government is working with private companies to develop Rapid
DNA analyzers that will cost as little as one hundred dollars and produce results in "under an hour."
See DHS Rapid and Low-cost DNA Biometrics, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.eff.org/file/36203#page/1/mode/lup (last visited Nov. 10, 2013, 9:41 PM).
82 See id.
83 The existing tiers include databases at the local, state, and national level. See LDIS SDIS, and NDIS,
DNA INmATIvE, http//www.dnagov/solving-crimes/cold-caseshowdatabasesaid/1disndissdis/ (last visited Sept
20,2013).
84 John W. Blackledge et al., Rapid DNA, 14 NAT'L ACAD. AssocIATE 14, 16-17 (2012),
available at
http://issuu.com/fbi_nationalacademyassociate/docs/fbimayjune2012_flipbk?e=3781121/2599422
(predicting that Rapid DNA will "soon become commonplace" police practice).
85 See Rapid DNA-Deployment Concepts for Government and Law Enforcement, INTEGENX,
WEBINAR (Dec. 3, 2012), http://integenx.com/webinar-rapid-dna-deployment-concepts-for-
government-and-law-enforcement/ (suggesting that rapid DNA testing will facilitate police
"connectivity" with CODIS as well as with local police databases not regulated by federal standards).
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All three of the scenarios I have raised here are far from inevitable. State
lawmakers could severely curb police discretion, prohibit compulsory DNA
samples in misdemeanor arrests, and ban DNA collection in Terry stops. But all of
the trends suggest otherwise. Police discretion is a perennial topic for complaint
but not for serious legislative or judicial action.86 Moreover, federal initiatives like
the Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act, signed into law just this year,
demonstrate legislative movements to expand the numbers of arrestees targeted for
forcible DNA testing. And few political careers are likely to be made limiting
the reach of "one of the most significant scientific advancements of our era" in
police work.8
V. CONCLUSION
Maryland v. King justifies in Fourth Amendment law an expansive use of
DNA sampling in the criminal justice system. Regrettably, Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion is at once too optimistic and doctrinally insufficient. The King
majority opinion is too sanguine that the benefits of ever-expansive DNA
identification by the government far outweigh the burdens on those whose profiles
end up in DNA databases. It is also insufficient in that it opens up, as this term
paper has suggested, many opportunities for DNA collection by the police that
extend beyond the limits of serious offenses or even the category of arrestees.
Justice Scalia's bitter dissent may or may not be prescient. We may be heading
toward a "genetic panopticon,"89 with all the innuendos of oppression that the term
suggests, or we may be moving toward a society in which "having a DNA profile
will . . . become as common as having a [cellphone] number or email address:
inconvenient sometimes, but tolerable because it is perceived as highly useful." 90
Whatever the case may be, King has firmly moved us on a road toward less genetic
privacy.
86 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 199, 211 (2007) (observing that neither judicial decisions nor public
pressure have resulted in important curbs on police discretion).
87 Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act, Pub. L. No. 112-253 (2013) (codified as 42
U.S.C. 14137a). The Act provides grants to states to implement arrestee DNA collection.
88 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013).
89 Id. at 1990 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9o See HUMAN GENETICS COMM'N, supra note 22, at 88.
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